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Categories of Verbal Ideas and Case Relations
Bruce Hollenbach Our belief that translation is possible, or, for that matter, that human beings can communicate at all, is based upon two presuppositions: 1) that human beings everywhere live in approximately the same world of experience, and 2) that all human beings have approximately the same mental and physiological apparatus.
But we must at the same time rec~gnize that all human beings must abstract to a high degree from the complex environment around them which constantly bombards them with great amounts of sense stimuli. We ~re required to impose order on, or find order in (depending upon your point of view), the world which we perceive through these sense stimuli. It is also clear that people of different cultures, of for that matter individuals within the s.:.me culture, abstract in noticeably different ways. Take for example the way in which people around the world vary in termo of their degree of differentiation of "things" like color, snow, horses, plants, etc. Notice also the different patternings that people perceive in the same perceptions, as for instance in the well-kn°"'m Rorschach tests. There is also some evidence that languages differ in the predications which can be made on the same observable events.
For example, the verb root in Copala Trique which is used to describe the same observable phenomenon which is described in English by the word "cover" as in 11 T:-::.e woma:i covered the baby with the blanket", actually predicates a different abstracted event than does the English root. In Trique, the corresponding sentence, in glo3ses, reads "The wom::m covered the blanket to the baby." That is, whereas in Englieih the event of something being done to the baby, with t:1e blanket as instrument, is predicated, in Trique an event of something happening to the blanket (i.e. being moved to the top of the baby) with baby serving as the new location of the blanket, ia predicated. Prom thia we must conclude that we cannot know what the "world of experience" really is, especially if we hope to go about our search merely by asking individuals what it is that they perceive. But, in linguistics we do not claim to be dealing with the "real world" but only with the meaning areas and patterns which people abstract from the world of experience and with the 11181l11er in which they convert these meaning patterns into a linearlpbonettc output. And, as a matter of fact, we claim that, although it is not possible to get inside of a man's mind to see what processes go on there, we can get some idea of what the bits of meaning and relations are which people actually do seem to employ and which are encodable into sound. We do this by the scientific process of building explanatory models, drawing upon the resources of introspection and observation in others of language behavior.
These models posit what we understand to be the raw (semantic) material behind the phonetic output we can meat directly observe and what processes are employed to convert that raw material into the observed output. These models can be compared according to the criteria described by Charles Hockett (1954) .
Of particular interest to us, along these lines, is the model proposed by Wallace Chafe (1970) . In this book he proposes that, in summary, language can be described as a system connecting meaning to sound through a sequence like the following: an unordered semantic structure is converted by means of linearization rules and other transformational rules into a surface structure of ordered semantic units (formatives), which then are spelled out, by what we call "spelling rules" into.underlying phonological (lllOrphophouemic) forms, to which phonological processes are applied to yield a phonetic output. The precise rules which come into play, as well as the possible combinations of semantic bits, are naturally language-specific. The model in general, as well, presumably, as the types of =ombinations of semantic bits and of spellings and of rules from which we select in describing a particular language, can be described in terms of more universal application.
Both Chafe (1970) and Charles Fillmore (1968) , limiting their discussions primarily to the formation of propositions (i.e. clauses), suggest that all such simple propositions can be said to be formed of a verbal element and a nwmer of nominal elements, each of which is related to the verbal element as playing a particular role in the event which that verbal element predicates. These roles are called case-relations, and the elements tied to the verbal element by them can be referred to as case-elements. The verbal element plus the case-elements form the proposition. It is understood that no proposition contains more than one element tied to the verbal element by the same case-relation. There may be, on the other hand, complex case-elements which are related as units to the verbal element.
(The notion of case, as used here, is distinct from the "surface structure" nntions of case, i.e. subject, object, nominative, genitive, etc.) 34a :Both Fillmore and Chafe, as well as a ntllllber of others, have defined sets of roles or case-relations. They have also s1.:bcategorized verbal ideas for convenience in describing the selitantic structures of different propositions in English. Presumably, case-relations as well as verbal categories can be used to describe verbal ideas apart from the ways in whicb these uill be 1,1anifested in teh granunatical structures of any particular language. ('l'he verbal element, for various reasons, is understood, as it is in tagn-iemics, to be central to any proposition, and that which, more than anything else, defines the form of the proposition.)
I have attempted to uork further in this same direction (see the attached Categories of Verbal Ideas), positin£ many more case-relations and sub-categorizing verl,al ideas in what is hoped to be a comprehensive manner and in a way entirely free front syntactical consideration. That is, I claim that there exists a set of categories such that any one meaning of any verb root from any language must belong to one category or another of it, and that the proposed set is fairly close to such a set. I also propose that for each category of Fillmore has demonstrated in his article "The Case for Case" how handily this system may be used for describing the way in which these semantic propositions (verbal elements plus case-elements) may be encoded into (English) surface structure. There is good reason to believe that it will be similarly useful in the description of any human language. The list of categories is also envisioned to tie in well with the use of paradigms (Pike -1963 , Thomas -1973 for grammatical description, with the study of role in discourse (Pike -1964 , Wise -1968 and with the question-technique of elicitation outlined by John Beekman (1968) . In particular, the approach of making a case-frame to correspond to every use of every known verb root has already been a help in the analysis of Copala Trique. (For background regarding case-frames as a convention in description, see Fillmore (1968) .) Surface structure can be described for Trique either by describing the syntagmemes on the clause-level which manifest particular case-frames (as some of the Philippine grammars do), or by describing linearization rules for arranging clause-level manifestation of case-elements into a surface-structure (as do Chafe and Fillmore) .
It should be understood that these are categories of verbal ideas, not necessarily of verb roots. Some particular meanings of particular verb roots may contain elements from~ than~ category. On the other hand, there may be !!£!. verb roots manifesting ~ areas of meaning in a particular langqa.ge. But, we may presuppose that all these areas of meaning are expressible i n~ way in any language, whethe1· by verbs, abstract nouns• adjectives, or whatever. If there should be an area which is not specifically expressible in a given language, then there must be forms from another area of verbal ideas which can focus in on the same event of the perceived world from another aspect, in order to abstract another abstracted event upon which to base a pertinent predication. This explains, for example, the different abstracted events behind English 'cover' and Copala Trique 'cover'.
A few additional comments on the Categories of Verbal Ideas are in order. 1) Not included on the chart are peripheral categories of time and peripheral locative. I view these as pertinent to modification of the occurrence of the event as a whole. E.g. in the sentence John threw the ball in the ditch downtown yesterday, one semantic interpretation would be that in the ditch serves to indicate the later-location of ball. The words downtown and yesterday, respectively, serve to describe the space-location and the time-location of the event as a whole, not of any particular participating element. Generally speaking, these two case-elements are tmderstood to be able to co-occur with any proposition of any category. 2) The notion of benefactive has no equivalent on the chart. The benefactive seems to be ab le to have so many di£ f ering meanings that no common denominator has yet been discovered by me, and I have not yet seen fit to handle this notion as a case-relation. It is a problem yet before us. 3) Comparatives, e.g. John walks like a duck, are being treated as relations between two propositions, part of one being deleted.
The following are some of the guidelines which could be recommended for use of the attached Categories of Verbal Ideas: 1) The analyst should familiarize himself with the categories and the range of meaning of each in 37.
order both to be able to categorize verb roots (or whatever) in the language under study and to be able to look for ways in t:1.1e language to express notions which are guessed to belong to a particular category. 2) Once a meaning of a verb root is recognized as belonging to a specific category, the analyst should attempt to validate, through elicitation or through recorded data, the various combinations of case-elements (i.e. the surface manifestations of same) which could be conceived of as occurring with that All of these sentences would be appropriate to the observed event described above. A good beginning guess regarding the category to which the root 'hit' belongs in CTr would be the category of Surface Contact, which is certainly the category to which the English root 'hit' primarily belongs.
Since we know that the above sentences are acceptable and that *hit ~ by itself is not, we may posit the following as the corresponding caseframe, understanding that ~ is playing the role of agentive, donkey the role of objective, and stick the role of instrumental, according to our definitions of the same and of their specific roles in relation to a verb of Surface Contact: [ __ A (OlI)]. (This case-frame indicates that the A must always occur and that at least O or I, and possibly but not necessarily both, must always occur with this root when it has this meaning.) The analysis to this point is above reproach, but it seems to lead to some anomalous problems when we compare the ways in which verbs like this are rendered, with their case-elements, in surface structure, and the way in which all of the other verbs of the language (literally) with these elements in their case-frames are rendered in surface-structure. In particular, we never find in the rest of the language that an instrumental is represented in the surface-structure before (i.e. to the left of) an objective, as for example stick precedes (on) donkey in ex. 3. Indeed, from my awareness of the way the rest of the language seems to operate, I would expect something like the following to be the surface structure of the case-frame I have posited for this meaning of 'hit':' *5. hit man donkey with stick But, it tums out that this construction is absolutely unacceptable in CTr.
Furthermore, phrases manifesting objectives never include the morpheme (glossed here as) on, and instrumentals always are manifested by phrases including a morpheme with, lacking in our data with 'hit', in all the rest of the language:
6. cut man foot with machete Clearly, the proposed analysis in inadequate. We take our clue from the rest of the data of the language, that on functions to mark the manifestation of a locative or later-locative case-element. So then, if we posit this use of 'hit' to be a root of the Location category, we can devise another case-frame, which hopefully will explain the usage in our data The above blow-by-blow description of the progress of a particular analysis is not intended to be a discovery procedure; I do not believe there to be any automatic, foolproof discovery procedure. It is, on the other hand, intended to illustrate the sorts of considerations which come into play in deciding what the case-frame for a particular meaning of a verb root is. It demonstrates in particular how a particular route which may seem intuitively correct may in fact turn into a dead-end. The part of the process which we rather skipped over is that of determining what the correspondences are between the case-frames and the surface-structures which will manifest them. There is not necessarily any discovery procedure here, either. But I claim that the best solution will be the simplest solution, i.e. that in which the simplest clause-level syntagmemes are
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posited to correspond to case-frames, or in which the simplest set of rules is posited to derive surface ordering from the pcssible combinations of case-elements found in the various case-frames. Since Fillmore's defined case-elements are different from those we are defining in connection with the attached Categories of Verbal Ideas, we will not likely come up with the same set of ordered rules for linearizing the case-elements into their positions in surface-structure that Fillmore posits. (Hopefully, for the ground covered by Fillmore in his rules, ours will turn out to be even simpler.) But I claim that for any language the set of rules for linearizing case-elements will be a simple set and will apply to all the case-frames with all of their case-elements of the whole language. I have yet to substantiate this claim for any particular language; but I envision that substantiation is not a long way off.
Note, in particular, that one of the critical factors indicating that the first case-frame for the morpheme 'hit' (above) was that the rules for linearizing the case-frames of the rest of the language as then analyzed would not in fact derive the surface-structure in the data from the first-proposed case-frame. In my drive for the most general, and therefore the simplest, solution (as well as for other considerations), I endeavored to reform my case-frame, and with it my semantic understanding of the utterances, in order that the list of rules posited from less-problematic data might also apply to the new case-frame in order to derive the correct surface-structure. So then, we find ourselves constantly looking back and forth between the meanings which we can conceive of as being behind the utterances of the language as a whole and the ways in which these meanings, whatever they may be, are manifested in the hard facts of surface-structure (which, itself, is something of an abstraction, of course, from the actual 42.
continuum of constantly changing sound through which this surface-structure is communicated from one person to another) looki.ng fc,r the simplest means of describing the apparent or posited correspondences between them. The question might be raised at this point, "Is it legitimate to place such importance upon simplicity as a criterion for determining that a given solution to the problem is be.tter than some other?" This question is beyond the present discussion. Suffice it to say here that if such a criterion be rejected we may be at a loss for a reason for doing anything else at all in II analysis" other than describing the phonetic data as it impinges upon our ears or some machine. It would be uninviting to attempt to posit correspondences between meanings and sound, since anybody's suggestion would be as valid as his neighbor's. In short, the model proposed here presupposes that the human mind tends to utilize the shortest path possible in the encoding of meaning into sound. 
Objective (undergoer, object, dative, experiencer, patient, goal) 45.
--that with which a given state is associated by the verbal idea or which undergoes some change or is affected as the result of the action denoted by the verbal idea.
Agentive (agent, actor, instigator)
--that which initiates, causes, or brings to pass the action or state denoted by the verbal idea.
Limit (referential) --that which is the limit, extent, or domain of the action or state denoted by the verbal idea, itself never being associated thereby with any state or change.
Verbal Adjunct --that which completes or further specifies the meaning of the verbal idea.
Instrumental --that which is involved causally in the state or action denoted by the verbal idea, but which is not initiator of that state or action.
Accompanitive --that which participates with the agentive or the objective in the state or action denoted by the verbal idea.
Material --that out of which a thing is made.
End-product --that into which a thing is made 46.
Possessor --that which stands in a relation of association, domination, control, or kinship to the objective of the predication.
Addressee
--that toward which a statement is directed.
Verbal Adjuncts
Name (Identity) --an arbitrary symbolization associated with a thing.
Classification --the name associated with a semantic class of things, by which a member-thing (i.e. the objective of the predication) can be referred to.
Equivalent --the thing with which the objective of the predication is associated as being "identical" or "the same". 
0-S Id
Jesus un-named him Simon.
A O
F-Id
CLASSIFICATIOil: --static and dynamic ideas, with reference to objects, of belonging to a known class of objects having a known label, by means of which a member-object can be referred to
The 1lards ranked the Yorts as mere peasants.
L-Cl
Jogging soon became a fashionable exercise.
0-S L-Cl
They were reclassified from the lower income bracket to the upper
The Yorts were mere peasants to the Nards. 
